In this paper, the existence of unemployment is partly explained as being the result of coordination failures. It is shown that as a result of self-fulfilling pessimistic expectations, even at Walrasian prices, a continuum of equilibria results, among which an equilibrium with approximately no trade and a Walrasian equilibrium. These coordination failures also arise at other price systems, but then unemployment is the result of both a wrong price system and coordination failures. Some properties of the set of equilibria are analyzed. Generically, there exists a continuum of non-indifferent equilibrium allocations. Under a condition implied by gross substitutability, there exists a continuum of equilibrium allocations in the neighborhood of a competitive allocation, when prices are Walrasian. For a specialized economy, a dynamic illustration is offered.
Introduction
This paper is motivated by the recent renewal of interest in equilibria with price rigidities, an interest stemming from motivations quite different from those which spurred the work on that topic in the seventies, see the survey by Drazen (1980) . The earlier interest reflected the premise that equilibria with quantity rationing are due to "wrong" prices, at which markets cannot clear. The more recent interest originates with the work of Roberts (1987a Roberts ( ,b, 1989a who established the existence of a continuum of equilibria with quantity rationing of supply at competitive prices, for a class of economies characterized by homothetic preferences (or household replication) and constant returns to scale. These equilibria do not reflect price distortions, but rather coordination failures; they are sustained, but not "caused", by downward rigidity of (some) prices. In this new framework, the extent of rationing is not linked to the size of price distortions and multiple equilibria are the rule.
The work of Roberts invites generalization in several directions:
1. relaxing the special assumptions on the primitives; 2. allowing for the possibility of non-competitive prices; 3. allowing for the combination of fixed and flexible prices; 4. explaining the persistence of downward (real) price rigidities; 5. understanding the nature and the sources of the coordination failures.
Several authors have contributed partial generalizations. In the framework of pure exchange economies, Herings (1992 Herings ( , 1996a Herings ( ,b, 1998 addresses (1) and (2), whereas Drèze (1997) , building upon Dehez and Drèze (1984) and inspired by Roberts and Herings addresses (1)-(3) in the framework of an economy with production. His result establishes existence of equilibria with arbitrarily severe rationing, but not a continuum of equilibria. Drèze (2001) addresses in addition (4) and (5) by arguing-outside the formal modelthat uncertainty and incomplete markets help explain both downward price rigidities for selected commodities (labor and capacities) and the volatility of aggregate demand (investment) which sustains the self-fulfilling expectations.
The present paper considers a general equilibrium model with production and the combination of fixed/flexible prices, thereby treating the general model specification. Our paper extends the result of Drèze to existence of a continuum of underemployment equilibria. It thus, addresses (1)-(3) in a general framework. The equilibrium concept is a generalization of supply-constrained equilibrium as used by Kurz (1982) , Van der Laan (1980 , Dehez and Drèze (1984) , here labeled "underemployment equilibrium" (see Definition 2.1). The existence of a continuum of underemployment equilibria can be explained intuitively as follows. We fix the prices of a subset of commodities, L II in number. This freezes L II −1 relative prices. But we allow rationing of the supply of these L II commodities. This leaves one degree of freedom, corresponding to the overall level of rationing for these L II commodities and to the level of flexible prices relative to the L II fixed prices.
Our interpretation of underemployment equilibria is in line with the interpretation by Hahn (1978) of non-Walrasian equilibria as the result of self-fulfilling beliefs. Drèze (2001) interprets underemployment equilibria in temporal economies as resulting from a combination of constraints inherited from the past or experienced currently, and constraints expected to prevail in the future. We do not spell out below alternative interpretations and refer systematically to "expectations of supply possibilities". Suppose prices are Walrasian, but neither firms nor households have the structural knowledge to verify this fact, and are therefore, justified in forming expectations on supply possibilities. If firms expect that the total demand for their output is low, then they will hire only a limited amount of labor. This has a negative impact on income of workers and thereby indeed leads to a low demand for outputs. Workers, expecting to be (partially) unemployed, supply limited amounts of labor and express low demands for commodities, thereby confirming the firms' expectations. The game-theoretic models developed by Roberts make clear that this reasoning is consistent with rationality, and even with the absence of deviating firms that sell at a lower price. Moreover, since coordination failures exist at non-Walrasian prices as well, but are then compounded by the effects of distorted prices, lowering prices need not improve the situation. These considerations touch (4), even though much remains to be better understood.
We also deal with the issue of whether underemployment equilibria are genuinely distinct, i.e. whether they lead to different utilities for the consumers. Moreover, in game theory and macroeconomics, coordination failures have the connotation of Pareto ranked equilibria. Pareto ranked equilibria are present in the seminal work on coordination failures of Bryant (1983) and Cooper and John (1988) , see Cooper (1999) for an excellent overview of this literature, where a continuum of equilibria ranging from a no-trade equilibrium to a competitive equilibrium is found. We give sufficient conditions in our general model specification to obtain this property.
Finally, we interpret the static general equilibrium model as an intertemporal economy. To do so, we specialize the general setting to an exchange economy in which consumers have logarithmic preferences and are endowed only in one commodity. The intertemporal interpretation of these specialized economies results in an intriguing inflation-unemployment trade-off: when prices increase, unemployment also increases. When we posit that prices adjust over time through a Walrasian non-tâtonnement process, we observe that this process monotonically approaches Walrasian prices. Moreover, it does not require demand rationing at any time and does not necessarily reduce the overall underemployment level in the economy.
The Model
For m ∈ N, R m + is the non-negative orthant of R m , and R m ++ is the strictly positive orthant of R m . Vector inequalities will be denoted by ≤, <, , ≥, >, and .
An economy is denoted by
There are H households, indexed by h ∈ H , F firms, indexed by f ∈ F , and L commodities, indexed by l ∈ L. 1 Every household h has a consumption set X h , a preference relation h on X h , and an initial endowment e h ∈ R L . The Cartesian product of the sets X h is denoted byX, soX = h∈H X h . Every firm f has a production possibility set Y f . The set of total production possibilities, f ∈F Y f , is denoted by Y . The Cartesian product of the production possibility sets is denoted byỸ , soỸ = f ∈F Y f . Household h receives a share θ fh of the profits of firm f .
The commodities are split into two a priori given groups, labeled I and II. Whenever such a label is attached to a symbol, it refers to the group of commodities indicated by the label. For instance, L I will denote the number and the set of group I commodities. Without loss of generality, group I consists of the first L I commodities. The prices of commodities in group I are assumed to be completely flexible, even in the short run. The markets for these commodities are organized in such a way that prices will immediately react to small changes in supply or demand. Examples are auctions (as for fish) or organized (commodity or stock) exchanges. The markets for these commodities are therefore, never cleared by rationing in an equilibrium. The prices of commodities in group II on the contrary are fixed in the short run. Like on many markets in the real world, small changes in supply or demand are not immediately accompanied by a change in the price. Hence, there is scope for rationing in the markets for these commodities, and agents in the economy may indeed expect rationing to occur in these markets. For real world examples of this phenomenon, we refer to the existence of persistent unemployment and to the presence of excess capacity in many sectors.
The prices of the commodities in group II are given byp II ∈ R L II ++ . We will normalize the prices such that l∈L IIp II l = 1. Nothing precludes to take forp II the values corresponding to a Walrasian equilibrium price system, if such a price system exists. If group I is empty, then all prices are fixed in the short run. We will assume that group II is non-empty, since otherwise we are back in the standard competitive framework.
Both for households and for firms, restrictions on supply seem to occur much more frequently in western economies than restrictions on demand, as remarked by Van der Laan (1980) and Kurz (1982) . Therefore, in this paper attention will be restricted to cases with rationing on the supply of households and firms, while the demand side will never be rationed. In the case of excess supplies, one needs a distributional rule to determine the final allocation that will result. Such a distributional rule is called a rationing system. In this paper we will consider the case where each household and each firm has a fixed predetermined market share, which allows for several interesting special cases like uniform or proportional rationing systems. Our existence results hold a fortiori for more general rationing schemes admitting fixed predetermined market shares as a special case.
The vector α ∈ R HL II ++ determines the market shares of the households (its components are denoted by α h l ) and the vector β ∈ R FL II ++ (with components denoted by β f l ) those of the firms. This rationing system implies that for every commodity l ∈ L II there exists r l ∈ R + such that the supply possibilities for every household h of commodity l are given by α h l r l and the supply possibilities for every firm f of commodity l are equal to β f l r l . In Sections 4 and 5, we will extensively study the case of an economy with households facing a proportional rationing system. In a proportional rationing system, α h = e h , h ∈ H , a so that for every h and l, supply possibilities are given by r l e h l . In this case r l can be interpreted as the proportion of good l endowment which is sellable on the market according to the rationing system, and r is said to be a vector of rations. This mechanism is justified when rationing is determined by the size of effective demand relative to total resources and households are treated symmetrically.
The vectors α and β only determine the supply possibilities of households and firms. Households and firms are completely free to demand a commodity and not to make use at all of the supply possibilities. The rationing system is treated like a black box. In reality these market shares are determined by all kind of factors that we will ignore in our model, like the ability of suppliers to sell their products, the location of households and firms, or the existing relationships between them.
The expectations of available supply opportunities for a household h (firm f ) on the various markets are described by a vector z h ∈ −R L II + (y f ∈ R L II + ), called the expected opportunities for household h (firm f ). The vector of expected opportunities (z, y) = (z 1 , . . . , z H , y 1 , . . . y F ) describes the constraints expected in the economy. In equilibrium the expected opportunities are required to be rational. These expectations should therefore, match the amounts allocated by the rationing system. For the case of the rationing system with fixed predetermined market shares, the set of all expected opportunities that are relevant is given by the L II -dimensional set ZY (fully determined by r for given α and β), where
Firms are assumed to be profit maximizers. For every firm f , given expected opportunities y f ∈ R L II + , the set of feasible production plans, s f (y f ), is defined by
Similarly, for every firm f , given a price system p ∈ R L and expected opportunities y f ∈ R L II + , the set of production plans maximizing profit, η f (p, y f ), is defined by (p, z h , w h 
and its demand set δ h (p, z h , w h ) is defined by
The total excess demand in the economy, given p ∈ R L and expected opportunities (z, y) ∈ ZY, is defined by
We are now in a position to give a definition of an underemployment equilibrium.
Definition 2.1 (Underemployment equilibrium). An underemployment equilibrium of the economy
The set of all underemployment equilibria of an economy E is denoted by E. Notice that the definition of an underemployment equilibrium implies that the expected opportunities (z * , y * ) belong to ZY. The expectations match the amounts determined by the rationing system.
The notion of Walrasian equilibrium fits easily in our framework. This is important since in many of our results we will be focussing on the possibility of coordination failures, and therefore, non-Walrasian equilibria, at Walrasian prices.
Definition 2.2 (Walrasian equilibrium). An underemployment equilibrium
In Example 4.2 and Section 5 we will focus on the subset of economies with no production, L II = L, i.e. prices are fixed for all goods, and with proportional rationing. We denote this subset of economies by A. These economies are particularly suited to further discuss our existence results and to illustrate some properties of equilibria in our model when there is coexistence of underemployment with rationing and Walrasian prices, i.e.p II is Walrasian.
Definition 2.1 applied to this class of economies can be easily stated relative to the underemployment equilibrium vector
For economies in A, we use the equilibrium ration r * rather than the rationing scheme z * , as it is more natural in this context. Of course, the two representations are totally equivalent.
It should be noted that in this special case and when p * =p II is Walrasian, it makes little sense to consider cases with r l > 1 for some l, since then households are not constrained at all in their sales of good l. Indeed, we can state an even stronger property of equilibria in this special case. Hence without loss of generality we can assume that r
For l ∈ L, we definē The proof is immediate from the definition of equilibrium.
Existence of a continuum of underemployment equilibria

Assumptions
In this section, we show the existence of a continuum of underemployment equilibria. We will make use of the following assumptions, or subsets thereof, with respect to the economy E. Assumption 1. For every household h ∈ H , the consumption set X h is non-empty, closed, convex, and X h ⊆ R L + . 
Assumption 4. For every firm f ∈ F , the production possibility set Y f is closed, convex,
Assumption 5. The price system and the rationing system satisfyp II ∈ R L II ++ with
Assumption 6. For every household h ∈ H , the consumption set X h = R L + , the preference relation h can be represented by a utility function u h , where u h is twice differentiable on
For every firm f ∈ F , the production possibility set is described by a twice
, and for any y f on the production frontier {y
Assumption 7. The set of group I commodities is empty, and for every l ∈ L, there exists
Assumption 8.
The economy E has a well-defined aggregate excess demand function z :
The often made assumption in the fixed-price literature that X h = R L + or that X h +R L + ⊆ X h is replaced by the weaker Assumption 1. 4 Assumption 2 implies that there is non-satiation with respect to the group I commodities and with respect to the group II commodities, a weaker requirement than monotonicity of preferences, though stronger than non-satiation.
A preference relation h is said to be convex if
The somewhat clumsy statement of Assumptions 2 and 3 guarantees that for the case L II = 0 we make the same assumptions as Debreu (1959) . For the case L II ≥ 1, our assumptions coincide with those of Debreu on the first L I commodities.
Assumption 6, which will only be needed for part of the results, states the standard differentiability requirements on the primitive concepts, see for instance Mas-Colell (1985) .
Assumption 7, which is also only needed for part of the results, is satisfied if households and firms are fully rationed in all markets, except the market for commodity l , and households receive no profit income, yet at least one household or firm prefers supplying commodity l over remaining inactive. Requiring this only at Walrasian prices would considerably weaken the assumption, since Walrasian prices are already balanced in some sense. Moreover, we only need the assumption in the case households or firms expect to be fully restricted in the supply of all other commodities, where supplying the commodity under consideration is the only way to achieve a positive income.
In addition to these primitive assumptions about individual agents, we shall need for our strongest result (Theorem 3.1(3)) an assumption akin to gross substitution. The assumption used in our proof of that result is a weaker form of the more intuitive Assumption 8. In the case of exchange economies, Assumption 8 could be stated for individual demands and would be preserved under aggregation. For this case, Movshovich (1994) gives assumptions on primitive concepts implying a stronger form of Assumption 8. The specialized economies to be considered in Section 5 can also be shown to satisfy Assumption 8.
Assumption 8 states that the net demand for any one good does not increase when the prices and/or supply possibilities of other commodities are decreased. It is not required that the net demand for the other commodities increases. Actually, we only use that assumption starting from a competitive equilibrium, and still in weaker form. But we are unable to illustrate meaningfully what is gained by the weakening. For instance, the assumptions on individual primitives required to guarantee gross substitution at a competitive equilibrium imply gross substitution everywhere.
We could state Assumption 8 for correspondences, following Polterovich and Spivak (1983) , but we use it in conjunction with Assumption 6, hence for functions, and therefore, state it for functions.
The existence theorem
an economy E. These two underemployment equilibria are said to be different if there exists a household h such that x * h =x * h . There is at least one household receiving a different consumption bundle. The way in which the production of the consumption bundles takes place or the prices against which trade takes place are of no concern for the notion of different underemployment equilibria. A stronger criterion for the distinction between two underemployment equilibria is given by the consideration of the utility tuples of the households. Two underemployment equilibria (p
are said to be strongly different if there exists a household h such that x * h hx * h orx * h h x * h . Notice that two strongly different underemployment equilibria are also different. Our first aim is to provide conditions for the existence of a continuum of (strongly) different underemployment equilibria.
By Debreu (1959) , (1) and (2) p. 77, it follows that the set of attainable allocations of the economy
Since A is compact, such a b exists, and since (e, 0) ∈ A it follows that b > max h∈H,l∈L e h l . Observe that all different underemployment equilibria are obtained when attention is restricted to ex-
The set of underemployment equilibria sustained by such expectations is denoted byÊ.
The extent to which the market for a commodity l ∈ L II is employed in an underemployment equilibrium (p * , x * , y * , z * , y * ) inÊ will be measured by the number υ l ∈ [0, 1], where
If υ l = 0, then the market for commodity l has collapsed completely and no supply is expected to take place. If υ l = 1, then no binding constraints on supply are expected in the market for commodity l. We will need this measure of employment to distinguish between different underemployment equilibria. 5
1. Under Assumptions 1-5, the set of underemployment equilibriaÊ owns a connected componentÊ c which includes an underemployment equilibrium with max l∈L II υ l = υ for all υ ∈ (0, 1].
5 For the special case of E ∈ A, it is possible to take b = max l∈L h∈H e h l . Note that r l ≤ 1 implies that υ l ≤ 1, all l. In fact, υ l will be in general strictly less than one, since υ l = (1/b)r l min h∈H e h l , all l. For economies in A we will frequently use r to distinguish between different equilibria as it has a more straightforward interpretation. Of course, r l and υ l are just linear transformations of each other. 
Under Assumptions 1-6, L
I ≥ 1, or L I = 0
Interpretation of the theorem
Theorem 3.1(1) states that there is a connected set of underemployment equilibria ranging from an underemployment equilibrium with arbitrarily low trade in the group II commodities to an equilibrium without rationing in the market for at least one group II commodity. The markets for the group I commodities are in equilibrium without rationing. This means that there are many different expectations leading to an underemployment equilibrium, ranging from the expectations that no household and no firm will supply a positive amount of any group II commodity, to the expectations that at least in one market for group II commodities free trade without rationing is possible. There exists an underemployment equilibrium (p * , x * , y * , z * , y * ) ∈Ê c with x * ,II arbitrarily close to e II , and y * ,II , z * , and y * all arbitrarily close to zero, so with all υ l arbitrarily close to zero. Furthermore, there exists an underemployment equilibrium (p * , x * , y * , z * , y * ) ∈Ê c where for some l ∈ L II it holds that no household and no firm faces binding expected opportunities in the market for commodity l, so x * h l − e h l > z * h l , ∀h ∈ H , and y * f l < y * f l , ∀f ∈ F , and υ l is equal to one. These two "extreme" equilibria are contained in a connected set of underemployment equilibria.
Figs. 1-3 illustrate some possibilities for the structure of the set of underemployment equilibria when E ∈ A, prices are Walrasian, and L = 2. Since there are L instruments to clear L markets, so there are L − 1 independent market clearing equations by Walras' law, one expects a 1-dimensional set of equilibria under suitable regularity conditions. When r exceeds r(E, p * ), these regularity conditions are obviously violated, which explains the rectangular area in Figs. 1-3 . Fig. 1 illustrates the case where the continuum of underemployment equilibria connects a no-trade equilibrium to a Walrasian equilibrium. It is not obvious, however, that the set of underemployment equilibria looks like this. The situation could also be the one of Fig. 2 , where a continuum of underemployment equilibria exists that is quite distinct from the Walrasian equilibrium. A priori, it cannot even be excluded that the set of underemployment equilibria is as in Fig. 3 . There are two different underemployment equilibria only, the no-trade equilibrium and the Walrasian equilibrium. Indeed, it follows easily from Walras'law that the continuum of equilibrium expectations, illustrated in Fig. 3 by the straight vertical line, leads to a unique equilibrium allocation.
We will show by means of Example 4.1 in Section 4 that it is possible that there is no underemployment equilibrium in the setÊ with υ l exactly equal to 0 for all l. However, we notice that for E ∈ A, no trade equilibria (with υ l = 0, all l) always exist when the price system is strictly positive.
In principle, underemployment equilibria obtained in Theorem 3.1(1) may all correspond to the same allocation. This is for instance the case if initial endowments are Pareto optimal. Otherwise, it is well-known that Walrasian equilibria will involve non-zero trade in at least one market. Therefore, Theorem 3.1(1) already implies existence of non-Walrasian underemployment equilibria when the price system is Walrasian and initial endowments are not Pareto optimal. However, the situation could still be the one of Fig. 3 with only two underemployment equilibrium allocations. This case is dismal from an economic point of view, because arbitrarily small perturbations away from competitive expectations would then lead to a severe depression. The second example in Section 4 discusses such a case in detail.
Theorem 3.1(2) makes clear that generically the continuum of underemployment equilibria that is shown to exist in Theorem 3.1(1) yields a continuum of strongly different underemployment equilibria. Keeping everything fixed, except initial endowments, there exists a subset Ω of R HL ++ such that the closure of R HL ++ \ Ω in R HL ++ has Lebesgue measure zero, and for every specification of initial endowments (e 1 , . . . , e H ) ∈ Ω, there is a continuum of strongly different underemployment equilibria. Generically in initial endowments, there is a continuum of different utilities that households can have in an underemployment equilibrium, irrespective of the prices of group II commodities being compatible with competitive values or not. If those prices have competitive values, then the Walrasian equilibrium is one of the underemployment equilibria. There is a continuum of equilibria that involve rationing. This follows immediately from the fact that Walrasian equilibrium is generically locally unique. Generically in initial endowments, the set of underemployment equilibria is therefore, as depicted in Fig. 1 or 2 .
Under which circumstances is there a continuum of underemployment allocations near a competitive allocation? For such a result to be true, it is necessary thatp II be compatible with a competitive equilibrium. Theorem 3.1(3) shows that the connected component of underemployment equilibria containing an equilibrium with approximately no trade in group II commodities also contains a Walrasian equilibrium if Assumption 8 is invoked, i.e. the structure of the set of underemployment equilibria is as in Fig. 1 . From this it follows by a simple argument that there is an underemployment equilibrium with min l∈L II υ l equal to any υ ∈ (0, 1]. Values of υ close to one correspond to approximately Walrasian equilibria. Theorem 3.1 is striking since it even holds in the circumstances that are most favorable for competitive equilibrium: all prices of group II commodities at competitive values and, in a world with time and uncertainty, all future commodities in group I.
The intuition behind Theorem 3.1 is best explained by considering the case where group II consists of commodities that we call labor services and group I of consumption goods. Labor services are supplied by the households to the firms, which use them to produce the consumption goods. If households expect that the total demand by firms for labor services is low, then households expect to have low incomes, and express low demands for consumption goods. Even though consumption goods belong to group I, so their markets clear, firms need to hire few labor services to meet the depressed demand for consumption goods. The low demand for labor services by firms thereby confirms the pessimistic expectations of the households. Theorem 3.1 makes clear that there is a continuum of pessimistic expectations that are sustained in equilibrium.
As Drèze (1997) argues, this reasoning can be given empirical underpinning. Theorem 3.1 shows that this reasoning can be verified formally. For the result to hold one needs downwards rigidity of the prices of the group II commodities. Otherwise, excess supplies of group II commodities could lead to lower prices of these commodities. However, Theorem 3.1 makes clear that also at those lower prices, there is again scope for coordination failures. It may be difficult to get out of a situation with coordination failures. All the households and firms together would have to revise their expectations simultaneously. An explicit dynamic process of expectation formation on prices and supply opportunities is presented in Section 5.
Following the arguments of Drèze (1997) , Theorem 3.1 has even more important economic consequences. For instance, it makes clear that the observation of excess supply is not sufficient to infer the existence of price and wage distortions. Indeed, Theorem 3.1(1) and 3.1(2) hold for any price system for the group II commodities, whereas the prices of the group I commodities are completely flexible. When prices or wages are not at competitive values, their distorting effects can even be magnified by coordination failures as expressed in Theorem 3.1(1). Because of the multiplicity of underemployment equilibria, the modelling of dynamics becomes crucial, and history will play an important role.
Two examples
In this section, we study two examples of our economies which will help illustrate Theorem 3.1.
The first is an example of an economy, which displays no underemployment equilibrium at which υ l = 0 for all l ∈ L II . 
, and L II = 1. The rationing system (α, β) can be chosen arbitrarily (satisfying Assumption 5). This example satisfies Assumptions 1-5. Therefore we know by Theorem 3.1(1) that there exists a connected set of underemployment equilibria that contains an underemployment equilibrium with max l∈L II υ l = υ 2 = υ, for all υ ∈ (0, 1]. Solving the firm's profit maximization problem yields that for every p 1 ∈ R + , for every y 1 2 ∈ R + , η 1 ((p 1 , 1) , y 1 2 ) = {p 1 /2, −(p 1 ) 2 /4} and π 1 ((p 1 , 1) , y 1 2 ) = (p 1 ) 2 /4. Since, the firm never wants to supply commodity 2, it is never affected by the supply opportunities expected in this market.
Let, the household be constrained by x 1 2 − 1 ≥ −υ. If it supplies υ to the firm, then p 1 = 2 √ υ is required for profit maximization. At that price, the unconstrained demand of the household is
, in which case the constraint is binding. There is a continuum of strongly different equilibria for υ ∈ (0, (1/9)] with p 1 = 2 √ υ; but there is no equilibrium at υ = 0, since this would imply p 1 = 0 and excess demand of good 1.
In Example 4.1, firms can transform labor into the consumption good at unboundedly large rates for small amounts of labor. Firms keep supplying the consumption good, no matter how low its price. This unrealistic feature drives the price of the consumption good to zero if expectations on employment are very pessimistic, which excludes the existence of an equilibrium at υ = 0. If an input vector subject to supply rationing is used to produce an output not subject to supply rationing and desired by consumers, then technology and tastes should be such that there exists a relative price for the output at which it is neither supplied nor demanded, given the prices and expected opportunities for the other goods. It is difficult to formulate assumptions on primitives that imply such a property, which should be related to the existence of a finite rate of transformation of inputs into outputs.
The second example shows, when L I = 0, Theorem 3.1(2) does not hold without Assumption 7: we might not even have a continuum of strongly different rationing equilibria.
Example 4.2. 8 Consider an economy E ∈ A with H = 2 and L = 3. For each household, the budget set at a Walrasian price system p, without the rationing constraints, forms a triangle in R 3 ++ . The rationing constraint corresponds to a line on the triangular surface of the budget set. Observe that the line associated with the constraint x 1 1 − e 1 1 ≥ −r 1 e 1 1 is parallel to the axis of good 2. The lower r 1 , the farther away this line from the axis. A similar situation occurs for the constraint on good 2, which is parallel to the axis of good 1. For good 3, the constraint line is parallel to the base of the triangle.
The Edgeworth box in this economy is a parallelepiped. The common budget set is a plane (which contains the two triangular budget sets of each consumer). The intersection of the box with this plane will in general have the shape of an irregular convex hexagon, with parallel opposite sides, corresponding to the area common to the triangles. Observe that in the Edgeworth box a given r cuts the budget set from opposite sides for the two households. Graphically, it is therefore, convenient to use r h l to label the line corresponding to r l for household h. At the Walrasian allocation, there is an indifference surface tangent to this triangle. Any lower indifference surface cuts the triangle in a (deformed) circular fashion.
We now construct an example of non-existence of equilibrium for some r 1 . Choose a Walrasian allocation x * (which is inside the hexagon) and an endowment e as in Fig. 4 . At this Walrasian equilibrium, household 1 is selling good 1 and buying goods 2 and 3, and vice versa for household 2. Corresponding to x * , there exist a vector r(E, p * ) of non-binding constraints and related lines r h l . Note that this vector can be computed without completely specifying the degree of convexity of u h . Choose r 1 < r 1 (E, p * ), so x * is not feasible for household 1. In Fig. 4 , we are now on the line r 1 1 . We are forcing household 1 to consume more of good 1. Intuitively, if goods 1 and 2 are complement, this household may want to consume a lot more of good 2 as well, say. This is represented by the shape of household 1's indifference ellipsoids, H 1 .
The optimal choice for household 1 is then shown at point A. We have to show that there are r 2 and r 3 less than 1 that yield an equilibrium. Graphically, this means that the optimal choice B for household 2 should coincide with A. Choose any r 2 2 and r 2 3 . If x * 2 is attainable for household 2, B = x * 2 and trivially there will be no equilibrium. If A is not attainable for 2, then again there is no equilibrium. If x * is not attainable for household 2, but A is, we can find u 2 that leads to indifference ellipsoids H 2 . Again, B = A, and no equilibrium obtains. Small changes in e h (in the fiber given by p), u h and r 1 do not alter the result, and in this sense the example is robust.
Hence, the normalization max l r l = υ cannot be substituted with r l = k. In a worst-case scenario, the indifference surfaces of the two households leave only two possible equilibria (in the allocation space): x * and e. Observe that in this situation an equilibrium is obtained for r 1 = r 3 = 0 and any r 2 ∈ [0, 1], the 3-dimensional analogue of Fig. 3 . This is because if r 3 = 0, household 2 does not care about the level of r 2 , and similarly if r 1 = 0 household 1 does not care about r 2 (r 2 is not binding). Hence for any υ ∈ (0, 1], an equilibrium will be given by r 2 = υ, and r 1 = r 3 = 0. These are not strongly different underemployment equilibria. It follows that the example violates Assumption 7.
Finally, it is apparent that the existence problems arise because of complementarities across goods. If we assume some sort of gross substitutability, see Assumption 8, the competitive equilibrium is unique and Theorem 3.1(3) implies that we can move from Walrasian equilibria to arbitrarily severe underemployment equilibria without jumps in (the expectations about) r.
A specialized economy
In this section, we illustrate further the bearing of Theorem 3.1 by considering a special, and specialized class of economies in A, namely: a pure exchange economy, with the number of goods L equal to the number of households H ; with the aggregate endowment of any good h ∈ L accruing entirely to the similarly (re)numbered household h ∈ H = L; and with household preferences represented by log-linear utilities. 9 , i.e. e h l = 0 whenever h = l; and for each h,
A specialized economy, fully defined by the parameters (a h , e h ) ∈ S L × R L ++ , h = 1 . . . H , satisfies Assumptions 1-8.
Equilibrium in specialized economies
Given a price vector p ∈ R L ++ and a vector of rations r
Let 
thereby defining q h = p h r h e h h .
Equality of effective demand and effective supply imposes, for each l ∈ L,
Define the matrix A by a ll = −1, a lh = a h l , h = l; Eq. (3) then takes the simple form A q = 0.
It is readily verified that the matrix A has rank L − 1. 10 Hence Eq. (3) implies that q is fully determined by the primitives (a h , e h ) h=1...H , up to positive scalar multiplication.
Thus, the ratio (q h /q l ) is a constant defined by the primitives. Similarly, the ratios (p h r h /p l r l ) are constants defined by the primitives.
The constraints thereby imposed on the products of relative prices and relative rations come from the demand side; they simply reflect the first-order conditions for individual demands, which happen to have clear-cut aggregate implications in the specialized economy.
The constraints place no restrictions on admissible prices, if rations are flexible. If all prices were fixed, relative rations (r h /r l ) would be uniquely defined, at under-employment equilibria; but the absolute level of the rations would remain free to vary, between 0 and a level such that r h = r h for some h; this is Theorem 3.1(1). Conversely, if the rations were fixed (say via expectations, or via a supply mechanism), the relative prices would be uniquely determined, but the overall price level would remain indeterminate (as well as inconsequential). Intermediate situations are also possible, with some goods unconstrained with flexible prices, some with predetermined prices and/or some with predetermined rations. The foregoing can be summarized in the following proposition. 11 and an equilibrium with at least one good unconstrained (Theorem 3.1(1) and (2)).
. , L are unrestricted; the absolute level of prices has no consequences for the allocations; the absolute level of rations determines the extent of under-employment of resources, and there exists a connected set of different equilibria containing a no-trade equilibrium
A dynamic interpretation
It is interesting to consider an intertemporal reinterpetation of the above-defined specialized economy. Let there be T periods indexed t = 1, . . . , T . For transparency, we restrict attention to specialized economies with time-independent parameters and non-storable goods. More precisely, we impose a ht = 1 T a h , e ht = e h , h = 1, . . . , H , t = 1, . . . , T . For each t = 1, . . . , T , prices p t ∈ R L + denote present-value prices as of period 1. For instance, (p t l /p 1 1 ) defines the rate of exchange at time 1 between one unit of good l available at time t and one unit of good 1 available at time 1. If prices were normalized by setting p 1 1 = 1, that 10 See (Bellman, 1970 
Market clearing requires
Without loss of generality, we may restrict attention to solutions verifying (4) 
Indeed, given any solution with x ht h > (1−r t h )e h h , one could lowerr t h to r t h = ((e h h −x ht h )/e h h ) verifying Eq. (6); all constraints in problem
thereby defining
Eqs. (6) and (7) imply
. . , T , and for
In turn, Eqs. (5) and (8) 
Thus, the nominal incomes, and market expenditures (good-by-good), of each agent are constant across dates in present value terms. Again, this property reflects the first-order conditions for individual demands. As such, these conditions place no restriction on the evolution over time (the dynamics) of either prices or rations-only on their products. There results, however, an intriguing inflation-unemployment trade-off. For two consecutive periods, t and t + 1, 
That is, intertemporal price increases are accompanied by equiproportionate decreases in employment of resources. At given prices, the continuum of under-employment equilibria in Theorem 3.1 takes the form of alternative overall levels of rations r, with relative values pinned down by Eq. (10).
In order to generate specific dynamics, one needs to add specific assumptions on the dynamics of either prices or rations. An example of such assumptions is provided by the Walrasian price tâtonnement (here non-tâtonnement), whereby prices are adjusted over time in the direction of notional (not effective) excess demands. That is, non-zero notional excess demands exert pressure on prices.
Define 
Proof. See the Appendix A.
ᮀ Proposition 5.2 establishes that Walrasian non-tâtonnement tends to a Walrasian price, even if it may not reach p * over the finite horizon T . At period T , the economy looks like our static equilibrium, with appropriately adjusted endowments. Hence, the convergence result suggests that underemployment equilibria at (almost) Walrasian prices are not just a non-generic curiosity. Because of the structure of the model, no demand rationing is needed along the adjustment path. With relative prices fully determined, so are relative rations. Using Eqs. (9) and (12), the associated dynamics for rations are given by:
Such a formula is introduced in Citanna et al. (1995) as a direct specification of expectations dynamics, where the expectations bear on rations, and where the specification reflects a supply mechanism based on uncertainty regarding market ability to absorb supplies above a certain level, and on the assumption that unabsorbed supplies are wasted. According to Eq. (13) and consistently with Eq. (10), excess notional supply at t triggers more optimistic expectations about rations at t + 1. One explanation is that excess notional supply at t leads sellers to expect lower prices, hence higher demand at t + 1. This is precisely the direction suggested by Walrasian price adjustments.
If, for some t, prices are Walrasian, rations stabilize as per Eq. (13). Their level remains arbitrary (or perhaps predetermined), because the overall level of rations throughout the process remains arbitrary (as per Theorem 3.1). More precisely (Proposition 5.1), if (p t ,r t ) t=1,... ,T support an underemployment equilibrium, then (µp t ,r t ), µ ∈ R + support the same equilibrium; and (µp t , νr y ), ν ∈ R + , ν such that νr t ≤ r t for all t, support a different (ν = 1) equilibrium with all quantities rescaled by the factor ν. A specific value ν also corresponds to a specific initialization of the process.
In the temporal context, the quantities could always be rescaled unexpectedly from some date t on, prices unchanged. But if the jump had been anticipated, it would have affected consumption demand at dates τ = 1, . . . , t − 1, and either prices or quantities would have been different. The possibility of state-dependent adjustments in ration levels at future dates can of course be treated formally in a model of time and uncertainty (on an event tree).
We compactify the consumption sets and the production possibility sets using the number b as defined in Section 3.2,
It follows from a standard argument that there is no loss of generality in using the compactified consumption and production sets when studying the existence of underemployment equilibria. The feasible production plans, supply, budget, and demand correspondences derived fromX h andŶ h are denoted byŝ f ,η f ,γ h , andδ h , respectively. Let us define the set P of prices, expected opportunities, and wealths by
Lemma A.1. Let the economy E satisfy Assumptions 1-5. Then the production possibility correspondenceŝ f : compact-valued, convex-valued and continuous , and the budget correspondenceγ h : P → R L of household h is compact-valued, convex-valued, and continuous.
Proof. Compact-valuedness and convex-valuedness ofŝ f are trivial. First, we show the upper hemi-continuity of the production possibility correspondence. Let some y f ∈ R L II + be given, let (y f n ) n∈N be a sequence in R L II + converging to y f , and let the sequence (y f n ) n∈N be such that y f n ∈ŝ f (y f n ). Clearly, (y f n ) n∈N remains in a compact set. Therefore, it has a converging subsequence, also denoted by (y f n ) n∈N , converging to, say, y f ∈Ŷ f . It has to be shown that y f ∈ŝ f (y f ). Since y f n ≤ y f n , it follows that y f ≤ y f . Consequently,
andŝ f is upper hemi-continuous. Next, lower hemi-continuity of the production possibility correspondence is shown. Let some y f ∈ R L II + be given, let (y f n ) n∈N be a sequence in R L II + converging to y f , and let y f be an element ofŝ f (y f ). The correspondenceŝ f is lower hemi-continuous at y f if there
For n ∈ N, let λ f n ∈ [0, 1] be defined by
For n ∈ N, let y f n be defined by
It holds that y f n ∈Ŷ f , since 0 ∈Ŷ f andŶ f is convex. Moreover, for l ∈ L it holds that y 
For n ∈ N, let x h n be defined by
It holds that x h n ∈X h by convexity ofX h . Moreover, using that p · x h < w h and p n ·x h ≤ p n · e h ≤ w h n , it holds for n sufficiently large that
and for l ∈ L,
So, for n sufficiently large, x h n ∈γ h (p n , z h n , w h n ). Notice that
The parameter q l coincides with υ l as defined in Section 3.2.
The correspondenceζ :
The restriction ofζ to the set ( 
To prove Theorem 3.1(1) we will use a fixed point theorem. In fact, Browder's fixed point theorem (see Cooper and John (1988) ), and the extension of it to correspondences as stated in Theorem A.3 (see Mas-Colell (1974) , Theorem 3, p. 230) will be needed in the proof. be a compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous 
and, for ε ≥ 0, the subset of the cube satisfying that each of its elements has at least one component greater than or equal to ε by
∅} has a very special structure as the following result shows. compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous 
is compact, and therefore, there exists a compact,
It follows that the correspondence ϕ :
is a compact-valued, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous correspondence, and the set Z × S L I × S L II −1 is non-empty, compact, and convex. By Theorem A.3 it follows that the set
Using that s * ∈ ϕ 1 (z * ) it follows by taking s equal to the lth, respectively (l + 1)th, unit vector that z * I l ≤ 0, ∀l ∈ L I , and
and the setZ c − is defined byZ c
− is connected by the connectedness of F c ϕ and the continuity of g. For every
The correspondenceζ has a continuum of points with a non-positive vector in its image set. These points range from a point on the boundary of Q L II (ε) with every component less than or equal to ε to a point on the boundary of Q L II (ε), where at least one component equals one.
We are now in a position to give a proof of Theorem 3.1(1). One of the problems we have to deal with is the possible lack of upper hemi-continuity ofζ at a point ((0,p II ), 0). 
Proof of Theorem 3.1(1). For
Let y * 1 be defined by y * 1 = y 1 + z, and y * f , f ∈ F \ {1}, by y * f = y f . It remains to be shown that y * 1 ∈η f (p * , y * f ). Since (x * , y * ) ∈ A, it follows by the convexity of h that x * h ∈ δ h (p * , z * h , w * h ), h ∈ H . Then non-satiation with respect to group II commodities and convexity of h implies p * · x * h = w * h , h ∈ H , and therefore, p * · z = 0. So p * · y * 1 = p * · y 1 . Since, there is no rationing on the demand side, it is obvious that y * 1 ∈ŝ 1 (y * f ), so it holds that y * 1 ∈η f (p * , y * f ).
For n ∈ N, take ε = (1/n) and denote the resulting connected component of (ζ ε ) −1 ({0}) byZ c − (n). By Hildenbrand (1974) ((s 1 , . . . , s L rmI , 0) , q), and since s l > 0 for some l ∈ L I , it follows by upper hemi-continuity ofζ that 0 ∈ζ ((s 1 , . . . , s L φ 2 (q) ). This leads to a contradiction, because the non-satiation with respect to group II commodities implies ζ ((s 1 , . . . , s L By Lemma A.2 and the continuity of the functions φ 1 and φ 2 it follows thatψ is a compact-valued, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous correspondence. SupposeÊ c is not connected, then there exist two disjoint, non-empty sets E 1 and E 2 such that E 1 and E 2 are both closed inÊ c and E 1 ∪E 2 =Ê c . Therefore, by the upper hemi-continuity ofψ, it holds thatψ −1 (E 1 ) andψ −1 (E 2 ) are closed inẐ c 0 . Suppose q ∈ψ −1 (E 1 ) ∩ψ −1 (E 2 ). Let ξ 1 , ξ 2 ∈ψ(q) be such that ξ 1 ∈ E 1 and ξ 2 ∈ E 2 . Then λξ 1 +(1−λ)ξ 2 ∈ψ(q), ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], sinceψ(q) is convex, so ξ 2 is an element of the connected component inÊ c containing ξ 1 , a contradiction to the construction of the sets E 1 and E 2 . Consequently, 
that l , the set of initial endowments e ∈ R HL ++ for which in every competitive equilibrium of the resulting economy E l (e) there is non-zero trade in the market for every commodity in L I ∪ {l }, is open. Moreover, ∪ e(−l )∈R H (L II −1) {(e(l ), e(−l ))|e(l ) ∈ (e(−l ))} ⊆ Ω l . Therefore, Ω l is an open set of full measure, and Ω = ∩ l ∈L II Ω l is an open set of full measure.
Let e ∈ Ω be given and letÊ c be a connected component of the set of underemployment equilibria of E = ((X h , h , e h ) We show that there is h ∈ H such that x h (1) = x h (0) or there is f ∈ F such that y f (1) = y f (0). Suppose, on the contrary, that x h (1) = x h (0) for all h ∈ H and y f (1) = y f (0) for all f ∈ F . Let l ∈ L II be such that there is no rationing in the market for commodity l in some underemployment equilibrium inÊ c . Then it follows that ((p l (1)) l∈L I ∪{l } , (x l (1)) l∈L I ∪{l } , (y l (1)) l∈L I ∪{l } ) is a competitive equilibrium for the economy E l (e). Since e ∈ Ω, there is non-zero trade in the market for commodity l , a contradiction. Consequently, there is h ∈ H such that x h (1) = x h (0) or there is f ∈ F such that y f (1) = y f (0) Clearly, (p(1), x(1), y(1) ) is a competitive equilibrium for E and therefore, (x(1), y(1)) is a Pareto optimal allocation in E. However, for every λ ∈ (0, 1), (λx (0) (1)) in E. Consequently, there are two strongly different underemployment equilibria inÊ c , and, by the connectedness ofÊ c , there is a continuum of strongly different underemployment equilibria inÊ c .
ᮀ
We generalize the assumptions of Theorem 3.1(3). To avoid unnecessary technicalities, we consider the case whereζ is a function, denoted byẑ. We parametrize relevant price systems and expectations of available opportunities by means of a vector q ∈ Q L . The first L I components of q are used to parametrize the prices of the first L I commodities, and the last L II components to parametrize the expected opportunities for the group II commodities. Let p * 0 be a competitive price system for the economy E. The function p : Q L → R L is defined by p l (q) = p * l q l if l ∈ L I , and
Notice that p(q) depends on q I only. Let B L denote the boundary of Q L , where all components are positive and at least one is equal to 1, so B L = {q ∈ Q L |∃l ∈ L, q l = 1 and q 0}. We say that z satisfies the boundary condition if ∀q ∈ B L , z(q) = 0 or ∃l ∈ L such that q l > min We prove Theorem 3.1(3) with Assumption 8 replaced by the weaker Assumption 9 13 .
Assumption 9. For at least one Walrasian equilibrium (p * , x * , y * , z * , y * ) of E the function z satisfies Condition (15).
Proof of Theorem 3.1(3). Let some ε > 0 be given. First we show the existence of a connected set Z c − such that for every λ ∈ [ε, 1] there is q ∈ Z c − inducing an underemployment equilibrium with l∈L q l = λL.
We extend z to a subset of the set R = {r ∈ R L |ε ≤ l∈L r l ≤ L}. Let ρ : R → Q L be the projection function that projects r on the set {q ∈ Q L | l∈L q l = l∈L r l } by minimizing the Euclidean distance to this set. Let the continuous, compact-valued correspondence ϕ : R → Q L be defined by ϕ(r) = {q ∈ Q L | l∈L q l = l∈L r l } and the continuous function g : R × Q L → R by g(r, q) = − l∈L (r l − q l ) 2 . Then the correspondence that assigns to r ∈ R the set of points q ∈ ϕ(r) maximizing g(r, q) on ϕ(r) is an upper hemi-continuous, compact-valued correspondence by the maximum theorem. Since ϕ(r) is convex for every r ∈ R it follows that there is a unique maximizer. It is clear that the correspondence coincides with ρ, so ρ is a continuous function. Using the first-order conditions it follows that if ρ(r) = q, then either l∈L r l = L and ρ(r) = 1 or l∈L r l < L and there is λ ∈ R, µ l ≥ 0, l ∈ L, ν l ≥ 0, l ∈ L, such that, for every l ∈ L, q l = r l − λ + µ l − ν l , µ l q l = 0 and ν l (q l − 1) = 0.
The set ∆ is defined by ∆ = {δ ∈ R L | l∈L δ l = 0 and δ l ≥ −1, ∀l ∈ L}. Then δ + bf1 ∈ R for every δ ∈ ∆ and λ ∈ As in the proof of Theorem 3.1(1) it follows thatÊ c is connected, whereas the properties given above imply that for every υ ∈ (0, 1] there is an underemployment equilibrium in
